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Brandt argued that public policy
demanded that major corporations
should not be permitted " to purchase
only the benefits in an asset purchase
transaction, while denying its attendant liabilities to the consuming public." Id. Nissen countered that the
asset purchase agreement was a valid
and fully negotiated contract in which
the burden of liability for injuries
caused by defective products had been
expressly allocated to the predecessor
corporation. Id. Nissen urged the
court to adopt the general rule with
only the four traditional exceptions,
because the rule balanced the " rights
of creditors and successor corporations," as well as "maintain[ed] adequate protection for the interests of
consumers . . . from fraudulent and
unjust corporate transactions." Id. at
568.
Before reaching its decision, the
court of appeals considered the doctrine of strict liability and its concept
offault. Id. The court acknowledged
that public policy concerns for shifting the financial risk of loss to those
better able to bear it was a policy
consideration in adopting the doctrine
into Maryland law. Id. at 569 (citing
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)). The
court, however, emphasized that the
thrust of strict liability actions was
that the sellers of products were at
fault when they put a defective or
unreasonably dangerous product on
the market and a user was injured. Id.
at 569. The court found that a corporate successor" [was] not a seller,"
and therefore, not involved in " bringing the product and the user together. "
Id. In addressing the present case, the
court stated that it would be " unfair to
require a party to bear the cost of
unassumed and uncontemplated products liability claims primarily because
it [was] still in business and [was]
perceived as a 'deep pocket. ,,, Id.
The court lastly reviewed the holdings from a minority of states who
have adopted the continuity of enterprise theory. Id. at 571-73. In analyz-

ing these cases, the court failed to find Restatement should still serve as a
a compelling reason to deviate from guide in determining what informathe traditional corporate successor li- tion qualifies as a trade secret. The
ability rule. Id. at 573. The court court also upheld the part of Maryl and 's
concluded that the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret Act providing
continuity of enterprise theory would for sanctions against parties who inibe inconsistent with Maryland law, tiate or maintain a claim in bad faith or
because it would require the court to without reasonable justification, but
abandon its fundamental principle that only if the claim was entirely without
there must be fault to impose tort color and imputed egregious behavliability. Id. at 574. Thus, the court ior.
Co-defendant Ross Agee worked
of appeals expressly rejected the continuity of enterprise theory. Because for Optic Graphics ("Optic"), an esBrandt's claim rested solely upon the tablished vinyl looseleaf binder manucourt's adopting that theory as a fifth facturer with a work force of nearly
exception, the court affirmed the trial 375 people and annual revenues of
court's decision granting Nissen's $27 million. Agee's responsibilities
initially included estimating costs remotion for summary judgment. Id.
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the lated to printing jobs for which Optic
Court of Appeals of Maryland for- intended to bid. Agee's duties remally adopted the general rule ofnon- quired that he have access to certain
liability of successor corporations, to- information which Optic considered
gether with its four traditional and confidential. As with all of its emwell-recognized exceptions. The rule ployees, the company maintained a
and the four exceptions were found to personnel file on Agee which included
be sufficient to protect both the inter- a confidentiality agreement.
Agee and his co-defendant,
ests of the consumer and business in
products liability cases. With the Michael Zanella, made efforts over a
court's decision, Maryland joined the number of years to join resources and
majority of states adhering to a tradi- buy a printing business. In June,
tional rule of non-liability of succes- 1989, without Optic's knowledge,
sor corporations with its four excep- Agee and Zanella took the opportunity
to buy a looseleaf bindery business
tions.
and formed what eventually became
- Linda M. Googins the third and final co-defendant in this
case, A to Z Looseleaf, Inc. (" A to
Optic Graphics, Inc. v.Agee: MARY- Z"). In order to obtain financing for
LAND COURT DEFINES " TRADE the deal, Agee and Zanella prepared a
SECRET" AND DETERMINES formal business plan including, among
WHEN SANCTIONS ARE APPRO- other things, a marketing strategy. By
PRIATEFOR BAD F AITII CLAIM October, 1989, they had secured a
UNDER MARYLAND UNIFORM loan which would lead to the settlement of their new business venture in
TRADE SECRET ACT.
February,
1990.
For the first time ever, an appelOptic
first found out about the
late court has examined the terms of
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret forthcoming A to Z when Agee reAct of 1989. In Optic Graphics, Inc. signed from his position with Optic in
v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. Ct. Spec. December, 1989. At this time, A to Z
App. 1991), the Court of Special Ap- had no contracts, assets, customers,
peals of Maryland held that Maryland's or raw material orders. On January
Uniform Trade Secret Act protects a 24, 1990, Optic filed suit alleging that
broader scope of information as trade Agee had misappropriated Optic's
secrets than the Restatement of Torts. trade secrets and breached a confidenThe court noted, however, that the tiality agreement. Specifically, Optic
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contended that Agee relied on pricing
and marketing information from his
estimating job to develop the A to Z
business plan and, in doing so,
breached the confidentiality agreement
by disclosing the information to third
parties without Optic's consent. The
law suit effectively stalled Agee's and
Zanella's efforts to get A to Z into
operation.
Once settlement efforts failed, both
parties prepared for trial. During his
deposition, Agee questioned the authenticity of his signature on a photocopy of the confidentiality agreement.
Agee's counsel hired a handwriting
expert who determined that the signature on the photocopy of the agreement was a forgery. On March 13,
1990, Agee's counsel informed Optic
that it had expert testimony attesting
to the forged signature. Despite the
validation of the forgery and its fatal
effect on Optic's claim, Optic refused
to meet Agee's and Zanella's demand
for dismissal.
At the close of trial, the court
found that, because the pricing and
marketing information in this case
was not a trade secret, no misappropriation took place. The trial court
imposed sanctions on Optic to pay
Agee's court costs and attorney expenses accruing from the time Agee
made Optic aware of the forgery, and
Optic appealed.
The court of special appeals first
considered whether the pricing and
marketing information was trade secret material, the parameters of which
the court had never established under
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret
Act(" the Act" ), Md. Com. Law Code
Ann. § 11-1201 to 1209 (1990). The
court recognized that, under the Act,
the information must meet two requirements in order to be protectable
as a trade secret. Optic GraphiCS, 591
A.2d at 587. First, the information
must derive " independent economic
value" from not becoming generally
known or ascertainable by those who
stand to benefit from the information's
disclosure and use. Id. Second, the
18 - The Law Foruml22.2

party claiming the information as a 1204, " Award of Attorney's Fees," in
trade secret must have taken" reason- the Act providing for the distribution
able efforts" to maintain its secrecy. of legal costs between parties in a
trade secret case, such as Optic GraphId.
The court recognized the rudi- ics. Id. at 587. In so doing, the court
ments of trade secret law in Maryland. separated the trade secret misapproBefore the Act came into law, Mary- priation claim and the breach of the
land courts followed the Restatement confidentiality agreement claim and
of Torts section 757 (1939) as the decided that section 11-1204 applied
authority on whether certain informa- only to the former. The court noted
tion qualified as a trade secret. Optic that section 11-1204 of the Act proGraphics, 591 A.2d at 585. The vides that a court may award attorney's
Restatement lists both a definition for fees if the opposing party makes a
trade secret and six factors for deter- misappropriation claim in bad faith.
mining if certain information is Id. The court reviewed similar case
protectable as a trade secret. Id.
law dealing with Maryland Rule of
The court compared the require- Procedure 1-341 regarding the impoments of both the Restatement and the sition of sanctions. The court posited
Act and considered that the most dis- that, in discouraging egregious behavtinct difference between the two au- ior by applying sanctions, a court
thorities involves the use of the infor- should not be so harsh as to dissuade
mation in business. Optic Graphics, parties from asserting colorable claims.
591 A.2d at 585 n.13. The court Id. at 589-90. The court emphasized
emphasized that, while the Act does that sanctions should not apply unless
not require that the information have a there is " clear evidence" that a party
purpose in business, such a require- initiated or continued an action that
ment is necessary in the Restatement, was" entirely without color and taken
making the scope of the Act much for other improper purposes amountbroader in coverage. Id. at 585. The ing to bad faith." Optic Graphic, 591
court, therefore, held that the Act A.2d at 590 (quoting Needle v. White,
encompasses the Restatement of Torts . 568 A.2d 856, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec.
The court emphasized the importance App. 1990)).
of the Restatement as sound guidance
In light of the court's earlier findin establishing meaning of the terms ing that pricing and marketing inforwithin the Act. Optic Graphics, 591 mation is generally protectable as a
trade secret, the court of special apA.2d at 585.
While the court of special appeals peals viewed the evidence as suggestrecognized that pricing and marketing ing that Optic may have had reason to
information can be a trade secret, the believe its misappropriation claim was
information involved in Optic Graph- colorable. Optic Graphics, 591 A.2d
ics was not a trade secret. The court at 590. The court, therefore, found
affirmed the trial court's findings that: that Optic was rightfully exercising its
(1) the pricing and marketing informa- free access to the courts regardless of
tion contained too many variables that whether or not it could win its case,
reduced its value to Optic's competi- and that the trial court erred in relying
tors; (2) the information was so easily solely on Agee's trial memoranda and
obtainable that it did not constitute a application for sanctions to find that
trade secret; and (3) A to Z would have Optic initiated the claim in bad faith.
been so small in comparison to Optic Id.
As for Optic's breach of contract
that the information would have been
of no value to the defendants. Id. at claim regarding Agee's confidentiality agreement, the court affirmed the
585-86.
The court of special appeals then trial court's finding that Optic contininterpreted the meaning of section 11- ued the suit in bad faith after learning

that, for the purposes of insurance The exposure, in his opinion, is the
claims involving asbestos, "bodily direct cause of the diseases and, thereinjury" occurs when asbestos fibers fore, inhalation constitutes the point
are inhaled and retained in the lungs, of" bodily injury." Mitchell, 595
even if no diagnosable disease has A.2d at 471.
manifested itself. If the period of
Maryland Casualty disagreed with
coverage has expired under a general Mitchell. It believed that because
liability insurance policy for an in- Mitchell's policy coverage had lapsed,
staller of asbestos products, claims for all asbestos-related disease claims
diseases which are caused by exposure against Mitchell were no longer covto asbestos fibers during the policy ered by Maryland Casualty. It felt that
coverage will be defended by the in- unless the disease has manifested itself
demnifier as if the resulting disease during the policy coverage, there was
had manifested itself during the period no obligation to defend or indemnify.
of coverage.
In support, Maryland Casualty introUntil 1976, Lloyd E. Mitchell was duced the affidavit of Dr. Paul Epstein,
involved in the sale, distribution and a clinician, which stated that exposure
installation of products which con- to asbestos does not always result in
tained asbestos. During the period of disease and that several events must
1965 to at least January 1, 1977, occur in conjunction with asbestos
Mitchell was covered by a general exposure before it can progress to
liability insurance policy from Mary- bodily injury. Therefore, in his opinland Casualty Company.· The policy ion, diagnOSis of the disease would be
required that Maryland Casualty de- the proper point at which to measure
fend and indemnify Mitchell from all " bodily injury." ld.
claims resulting from asbestos-related
Both parties filed for declaratory
bodily injuries which occurred during judgment in the Circuit Court for
the insurance policy period. The HarfordCounty. Afterthecomplaints
policy defined" occurrence" as "an were filed, each party also moved for
accident, including continuous or re- summary judgment claiming that no
peated exposure to conditions, which material facts were in dispute. The
results in bodily injury . . . neither trial court ruled in favor of Maryland
expected nor intended from the stand- Casualty's motion, finding that the
point of the insured." The policy point of" bodily injury," for the puradditionally defined "bodily injury" poses of insurance coverage, should
as " bodily injury, sickness, or disease be measured by the point of manifessustained by any person which occurs tation of the asbestos-related disease.
during the policy period."
Mitchell appealed, and the Court of
After his insurance coverage had Appeals of Maryland granted certiolapsed, Mitchell was sued by several rari before consideration by the court
individuals who had been exposed to of special appeals.
asbestos in his products. He sought to
The appellate court considered two
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: have Maryland Casualty defend against issues. The first issue was whether,
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ASBES- the claims, arguing that, because the under a comprehensive generalliabilTOS-RELATED DISEASES UN- people were injured from products ity insurance policy, coverage is trigDER A GENERAL LIABILITY IN- installed during the period of cover- geredatthepointofinitial exposure or
SURANCE POLICY, "BODILY age, he should be defended and indem- when an asbestos-related disease first
INJURY" OCCURS WHEN THE nified from those claims. In support manifests itself to a clinically detectVICTIM IS INITIALLY EXPOSED of this contention, Mitchell introduced able degree. Second, the court conTO THE HAZARDOUS CONDI- the affidavit of Dr. John Craighead, a sidered whether the circuit court erred
TION.
physician and pathologist. It stated in adopting the " manifestation" theory
In Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty that asbestos fibers injure the lungs infmdingforMarylandCasualtywhen,
Co., 595 A.2d 469 (Md. 1991), the upon inhalation, and the resulting in- pathologically, damage to the body
Court of Appeals of Maryland held jury leads to a variety oflung diseases. from asbestos could occur upon expoof the forgery. ld. The court held that
the evidence of both the forged signature on the agreement and Optic's
awareness of the forgery on March 13,
1990, may have carried the requisite
weight for the trial court to find that
Optic continued the suit in bad faith.
The court remanded the case with the
view that the fees and expenses from
the misappropriation claim may be
severable from those associated with
the breach of contract claim, depending on what the trial court finds on
remand. ld. at 590.
The decision of the court of special appeals in Optic Graphics offers
the Maryland legal community some
insight as to the direction lower courts
may take in deciding disputes under
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret
Act. While courts must regard the
Restatement of Torts as a guide in
defining terms within the Act, they
shall look specifically to the Act for
settling such disputes. Furthermore,
the Maryland legal community can
expect courts to look to general provisions under Maryland Rules ofProcedure and Maryland case law when
sanctioning parties who bring bad
faith trade secret misappropriation
claims under the Maryland Uniform
Trade Secret Act. As for the ambitious employees who decide to branch
off on their own from the powerful,
more established employer, the court
of special appeals has interpreted the
Act to fully protect those daring souls
and their former employers who act in
good faith.
- Michael E. Muldowney
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